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| Home > Unified Communications News > Cisco Spotlight Series: A jolly good 'fellow' | |
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What's it like being a Cisco fellow? The San Jose, Calif.-based Cisco Systems Inc. only bestows the title upon its most brilliant and eminent engineers and managers, but one fellow downplays the glamour. In fact, those expecting the fraternity's quarterly gatherings to resemble spring break in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., would be deeply disappointed. "It's not one of those celebrity gatherings," said fellow David Oran. "You know the joke about the extroverted engineer: He looks at your shoes rather than his own when he talks to you. We all have our feet on the ground." Oran, a Cisco fellow since 2000, has helped develop numerous networking standards and is one of the vendor's top IP telephony architects. He recently spoke with SearchEnterpriseVoice.com about the real promise of VoIP, the resurgence of SIP and his controversial take on quality of service (QoS). ![]() What's the most interesting or exciting thing happening in the enterprise VoIP market right now, in your opinion? Now we're at the point where people are exploiting the technology to do things you couldn't do with a PBX. People aren't talking about how to make VoIP as good as a legacy PBX anymore; it's assumed that we're there or close to being there. Will there be a "killer app" or functionality that will drive awareness of those advanced capabilities? You've been vocal about the complexities involved with developing Session Initiation Protocol -compliant VoIP equipment that is not only secure, but also functions with the QoS that corporate users expect. Can you elaborate on those complexities, and on Cisco's efforts to provide end-to-end SIP support? SIP has a different architecture than some legacy protocols. Basically, some legacy PBX features are harder to develop with SIP. Now we're getting over that hump. The people who have developed SIP products have that experience under their belts, and the strengths can now be exploited to do some very sophisticated stuff. In terms of security, we're quite a bit further along than we were. The ITF standards in these areas have been pretty well solidified with just one or two holes remaining, so industry agreement has increased dramatically as well. What more can you tell me about the upcoming CallManager release? Will the evolution of the core SIP primitives ever reach a point where SIP-compliant gear from multiple vendors will offer data transfer interoperability without needing vendor customization? One is the guarantee that something won't get screwed up if you mix and match equipment from different vendors. I don't think we're quite there yet, but the SIP Forum is working on an effort to group phone functions into various classes. That will allow vendors to group functions into various classes and express what a product does based on a narrower set of categories, instead of listing 100 different features. That will be helpful to customers, but it'll be six or eight months before that's available to the industry. The other thing is they want some kind of stamp or certification that guarantees interoperability according to a set of specifications governed by some authority. I don't think that will happen because, in a sense, interoperability is at odds with certification. Nobody goes to the suppliers of their IP stacks or Ethernet controllers asking for certification, and the reason is stuff just interoperates. The SIP community in general has resisted certification. Certification doesn't always promote interoperability in the broad sense, though it may in a narrow sense for the big vendors who can pay $20,000 or $30,000 per product to get a certification. So avoiding certifications in the VoIP industry is about keeping costs down and promoting competition? On the other side, though, doesn't that make it more difficult for enterprises to choose products in the short term?
You stated that many security threats, including denial-of-service attacks, are actually QoS problems. Can you explain? The approach of the security world is to decide to either allow or disallow packets from a certain source on the network. That's where I think they've gone off the rails in the sense that if you take that approach, you only have one large hammer to use against someone -- you have to drop their packets or allow them. I'm saying there's a large middle ground. To that end, should organizations rethink certain security paradigms?
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